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Abstract
International trade has been playing an extremely significant role in China over the last
20 years. This paper is aimed at investigating and understanding the relationship between
China’s macro-economy and oil price from this new perspective. We find strong evidence to
suggest that the increase of China’s price level, resulting from oil price shocks, is statistically
less than that of its main trade partners’. This helps us to understand the confused empir-
ical results estimated within the SVAR framework and sheds light on recent data. More
specifically, as for the empirical results, we find China’s output level is positively correlated
with the oil price, and oil price shocks slightly appreciate the RMB against the US dollar.
Positive correlation between China’s output and oil price shocks presumably results from
the drop in China’s relative price induced by oil price shocks, which is inclined to stimulate
China’s goods and service exports. The slight appreciation of the RMB could be justified
by the drop in China’s relative price, which is indicated by economic theory. Moreover,
constructing a simple model, our new perspective also helps us to understand the recent
fact that together with the dramatic surge of the world oil price, while the oil imports of the
other major countries (especially the largest oil import country US) in the world steadily
decline or remain stable, China’s oil imports, in contrast, have kept rising steeply since the
year 2004.
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1 Motivation and Introduction
China has enjoyed impressive economic growth and undergone spectacular economic trans-
formation since introduction of profound economic reforms in 1978. At the same time, it is also
increasingly dependent on oil resources. The International Energy Agency (IEA) documented
in a research report that the oil demand of China would keep increasing in a foreseeable fu-
ture, associated with its fast speed industrialisation and urbanisation. According to Panel A of
Figure 1, China first became an oil-import country in around 1992, which happens at the time
of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour and China’s shift towards a fully-fledged market economy.
Since then, oil imports to China have steadily increased, and was even immune to the financial
crisis of 2008; it surpassed Japan and became the second largest oil-importer that year.
Figure 1: Net Oil Imports of Main Countries and World Oil Price
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Morever, increasing oil imports to China have been accompanied by rising oil price in gen-
eral. What we can easily conclude from Panel B of Figure 1 is that the oil price has gradually
climbed, with a small drop during 1997-1999 possibly resulting from Asian financial crisis,
since 1992. It upsurges dramatically after 2002. Interestingly, this timing quite closely follows
that of China’s entry into the WTO. Although with a sharp decline during the financial crisis
between 2008 and 2009, the price gained momentum and instantaneously rebounded back af-
ter that, more importantly, seemingly with a higher volatility. Unambiguously, the interactions
between the world oil price and China’s macro-economy should have been more significant
than ever.
Apart frommany distinguished characteristics (the pricing of oil being not completely com-
mercialised, for instance) from other economic entities, a salient feature of China is that it relies
heavily on international trade. To study and better understand the effects of oil price shocks
on China’s macro-economy, it is essential and helpful to put sufficient attention on the fact that
China is a typical export-oriented country. Concretely, it ranks first in terms of the proportion
of total trade to GDP, which peaked to 65.3 % in 2006. On average, this proportion is as high as
46.5% during 1992-2013. These figures are calculated according to data from China’s National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). As shown in Figure 2, both total trade and exports from China rose
gradually from 1992, with a dramatic upsurge around 2001, and with a descend in 2008, but
immediately followed by a retaliatory rebound, and even more sharp growth thereafter.
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Figure 2: Trade and Exports of China
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Figure 3: Value of Trade with China and Oil Imports of Different Countries
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In addition, Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates that the countries importingmore oil are basically
the ones that trade more with China, and Panel B of Figure 3 with alternative measurement–
net oil imports–documents almost the same case. As the value of oil imports and the value
of trade with China span a large interval, we use a log-scaled coordinate system in Figure 3.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 combined show on the one hand, that international trade is essential
for China (indicated by Figure 2), on the other hand, that China’s main trade partners are also
major oil-dependent countries in the world (indicated by Figure 3). We have reason to believe
that oil, as the most important bulk commodity in international trade today, will potentially
change China and its partners’ relative price level and further the goods and service exports
of China or other relevant variables. This insight enlightens us to study and understand the
effects of oil shocks on China estimated by econometric models and observable facts in the data
from this newperspective, and accordingly distinguishes our paper from the existing literature.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we review the literature
related to our paper, followed by the methodology used in our paper in section 3. We describe
the data and report the empirical results in section 4. Section 5 concludes. An appendix is also
available in the end of this paper.
2 Related Literature Review
The first oil crisis occurred in the 70s of the last century has spurred a large amount of litera-
ture which concentrates on the relationship between oil shocks and macro-economic activities.
Nevertheless, considerable debates persist over the effects of oil price shocks in terms of both
quantity and direction. Moreover, a variety of distinguished underlying transmission mecha-
nisms have been raised to rationalize the corresponding different empirical results.
Observing the fact that seven out of the eight postwarU.S. recessions have been preceded by
a sharp increase in the price of crude petroleum, Hamilton (1983) concludes that oil shocks are a
contributing factor in at least some of the US recessions prior to 1972. Hamilton (1996) proposes
a measure of asymmetric oil price–net oil price increase, which is the maximum of zero and the
difference between the level of the crude oil price in quarter t and the maximum value for the
level achieved during the previous four quarters. The author draws a conclusion that sup-
ports his point in 1983 that real output of the US is negatively correlated with oil price shocks
and the relationship is also statistically significant. A series of his following work (Hamilton
(2005), Hamilton (2009) and Hamilton (2010)) reported similar results. Jime´nez-Rodrı´gueza et
al. (2005) confirm that the real GDP growth of oil importing economies suffers from increases
in oil prices in both linear and non-linear models. Constructing large-scale macro-financial-
econometric-model, Morana(2013) finds that oil market shocks have contributed to slow eco-
nomic growth since the first Persian Gulf War episode. Lin&Mou (2008) explore the effects of
oil price shocks on China within the framework of computational general equilibrium (CGE),
and also present similar results. It is also the case for Zhang & Xu(2010). Le & Chang (2013)
study the relationship between oil price shocks and trade imbalances, and find that for net oil
importing economies, unfavourable outcomes are associated with oil price shocks.
By contrast, other prominent researches have drawn modest or even different conclusions.
Bernanke et al. (1997) suggest that an important part of the effect of oil price shocks on the
economy results is not from the change in oil price itself, but from the resulting tightening of
monetary policy. Darrat et al. (1996) provide evidence to show that once the resulting interest
rate increase is controlled, the effects of oil price shocks on the US economy will not be statis-
tically significant any more. Barsky & Kilian (2004), argue that the effect is small and that oil
shocks alone cannot explain the US stagflation of the 1970s. , Blanchard & Galı´ (2007) present
evidence showing that the dynamic effect of oil shocks has decreased considerably over time,
owing to a combination of improvements in monetary policy, more flexible labour markets,
and a smaller share of oil in production. Wong (2013) provides evidence to show that inflation
pass-through from oil shocks in the 21st century relative to the 1970s has dampened. Establish-
ing a five-variable VAR model Du et al. (2010) examine the influences of oil price shocks on
China’s macro-economy. Their results show that China’s output is positively correlated with
oil price shocks, which is similar to our findings. But our paper is different fromDu et al. (2010)
in both methodology and explanation.
Some researches are committed to studying the underlying transmissionmechanisms through
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which oil price shocks influence the macro-economy. Noticing that the empirical results are dif-
ferent, it is rather natural that the corresponding underlying transmission mechanisms used to
interpret them are also dissimilar. In general, there are two different views on the relationship
between oil price shocks and economic recession. One is they are statistically correlated to each
other, the other is that this relationship is not significant or is not clear.
We first concentrate on the ones supposing that economic recession is statistically correlated
to oil price shocks. According to Bernanke (1983), uncertainty could lead to a postponement of
purchases for capital and durable goods, so the oil price shocks will influence the economy by
increasing the uncertainty firms are confronted with. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) suggest
that the imperfect competition of the production market may better interpret the large neg-
ative effects of oil price shocks. Finn (2000) points out that in order to minimize depreciation
expenses, when energy price changes, firms adjust capital utilisation rates. Ramey&Vine (2010)
argue that when the oil price rises, a shift in demand away from larger cars seems to have been
a critical feature of the macroeconomic response to historical oil shocks. We now turn to the
other side. Rogff (2006) elaborates that the effects of the oil shocks on the economy are generally
weakened by technological advancements, improved energy efficiency, and the development
of the financial market. As for the result that China’s output is positively correlated with oil
price shocks found by Du et al. (2010), the authors argue that this is presumably linked to that
both China’s growth and the world’s oil price are affected by US and EU countries’ economic
activity in the same direction. Morana (2013) documents that as the negative impact on domes-
tic demand may be mitigated by the increase of external demand (due to boosted imports of
net oil export countries), the overall implications of the oil price drag mechanism are, however,
not clear.
In summary, it can be stated that there is no consensus on empirical results about the effects
of oil price shocks on the macro-economy. In addition, it is also the case for the transmission
mechanisms throughwhich the oil price shocks affect the macro-economy. Moreover, although
a large amount literature has studied the transmission mechanisms, quite a few concentrate
on the issue of China. Considering the reasons mentioned in section 1, We start by examining
how international trade transmission mechanism works and then investigate the effects of oil
price shocks on China’s macro-economy from this perspective. Finally, constructing a simple
model, we fit this transmission mechanism to recent data. A related paper is Rasmussen &
Roitman(2011). The authors argue that the negative impact of oil price shocks on oil-importing
countries is partly offset by concurrent increases in exports and other income flows, and argue
that these flows arise from high commodity prices being associated with good times for the
world economy as well as from the recycling of petrodollars by oil-exporting. By contrast, we
model these flows via a drop in China’s relative price resulting from oil price shocks. Another
related paper is Allegret et al. (2014), which investigates oil price shocks’ effects and their as-
sociated transmission channels on global imbalances. They find that associated with oil price
shocks, there is a transfer of wealth from oil-importing countries to oil-exporting ones. Our
paper, however, proposes that this transfer can also happen between oil-import countries.
3 Methodology
We first investigate the relationship between oil price and price levels of different countries.
Then we explore and understand the structural vector auto regression (SVAR, hereafter) es-
timation results and a recent stylized fact from this perspective. More specifically, we first
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convey a simple regression model to explore the relationship between the oil price and price
levels of China and other countries, and further the relative price of goods and services of
China to other countries, which plays an essential role in international trade. Secondly, the
SVAR method, which is used to find the effects of oil price shocks on China’s main macro-
economic variables, is introduced; After that, to check the plausibility and robustness of the
SVAR model, the asymmetric test and alternative oil price specification are presented. Finally,
we also construct a simple model to illustrate the implications of our findings to recent data.
3.1 Oil Price and Price Level of Different Countries
International trade is influenced by many factors, for simplicity and tractability, we exclusively
concentrate on the most essential one–the relative price level of goods and services of different
countries. In order to investigate the relationship between the oil price and the price level of
different countries, we consider the regressions of (China’s and other countries’s) price levels
on the world oil price. In the light of the analysis above, we don’t include all countries that
trade with China, instead, we choose the countries according to the criteria: The country is a
member of the OECD countries or BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in our
paper; The country is one of China’s major trade partners and also imports oil from other coun-
tries. The countries that simultaneously satisfy all of the criteria are reported in Table 7. Other
countries are excluded. For example, although Norway is a member of the OECD countries
and one of China’s major trade partners, it is an oil-export country (it exports 2285 thousand
barrels per day over the period 1992-2012), thus is excluded from our analysis.
Our regression model is:
CPI = α0 + α1OilP+ α2X + µ (1)
In which CPI denotes the general price level, OilP is the world oil price, and X is control
variables including GDP growth rates, short-term interest rates, money supply growth rates
and the exchange rates against the US dollar. To compare the different effects of world oil price
on China and the countries we choose according to the three criteria above, we first run the re-
gression for China, and then for other countries as a whole. In the view of the fact that central
banks may react to price level increases, we also carry out instrumental variable (IV, hereafter)
estimations which will be described in detail in section (4). In addition, while we have con-
trolled the important variables, it may be the case that the lag of oil price could still affect price
level, therefore the lag of oil price should be included in the regression model.
In addition, increased oil price volatility may affect the price level, since increased uncer-
tainty presumably influences firms’ investment decisions (Bernanke(1983) & Pindyck(1991))
which in turn are closely linked to price level. The world oil price volatility itself is of rele-
vance and emphasised by many authors (Merton (1980), Anderson et al. (2003), Park & Ratti
(2008) and Pinno & Serletis (2013), for example). For robustness, oil price volatility needs to be
included in the regression model (equation (1)), which can be regarded as another sensitivity
check of the regressions above. Before doing this, we need to measure the oil price volatility.
In the paper of Merton (1980), Anderson et al. (2003) and Park & Ratti (2008), the measure of
monthly oil price volatility is defined as the the sum of squared first log differences in a daily
spot oil price:
VOLt =
nt
∑
i=1
(log(Pd+1t )− log(P
d
t ))
2
nt
(2)
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In which nt denotes the number of trading days in month t. Since trading days in different
months are not the same, we can not simply replace nt with 30. P
d
t stands for the spot oil price
in day d of month t .
China is a transition country, and its oil imports in 2012 are 15.8 times as many as those in
1993. We calculate this number based on the data fromU.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA, hereafter). Obviously, the oil price volatility in 1993 is different from that in 2012. In view
of this distinguished characteristic of China, we need to introduce a new measure of oil price
volatility, which is intended to capture the transition features of China. What we do is weight
the measure of Merton (1980), Anderson et al. (2003) and Park & Ratti (2008) by the ratio of oil
import to output. Formally, it could be formulated as:
WVOLt =
Et
Yt
·
nt
∑
i=1
(log(Pd+1t )− log(P
d
t ))
2
nt
(3)
Where WVOLt is weighted oil price volatility, and the remainder notations possess the same
meanings as the ones in equation (2). WVOLt and VOLt is plotted in Figure 4. Both WVOLt
and VOLt are normalised values. Figure 4 suggests thatWVOLt is statistically less than VOLt
from 1994 to 2000, reflecting the less importance of oil for China in this period. Nevertheless,
they are quite close to each other (WVOLt is marginally higher than VOLt) after 2000. Both
WVOLt and VOLt show that the three sharpest spikes are successively in 1999, 2003 and 2009.
The one in 1999 presumably associated with the Asian financial crisis happened during 1998-
2000; The spike in 2003 may be due to the Iraq War waged in March 2003. The last, also the
sharpest, spikemay largely be contributed by the financial crisis of 2008. The oil price volatility
is included in the regression model (equation (1)).
Figure 4: The Volatility of Oil Price
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3.2 SVARModel
In virtue of the work of Sims (1980), the vector auto-regression (VAR), has already become a
widely used approach in macro-economy empirical analysis. Nevertheless, VAR is also con-
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stantly exposed to the criticism that it lacks economic interpretations. As Bernanke et al. (1997)
indicates, it is not possible to infer the effects of changes in policy rules from a standard identi-
fied VAR system, since this approach typically provides little or no structural interpretation of
coefficients that make up the lag structure of the model. By contrast, SVAR incorporates some
structures or the economic theory into the analysis. Hence, we will investigate oil price shocks
within the framework of the SVAR in this paper. Formally, the SVAR system is formulated as:
A(IK −A1L−A2L
2 − · · · · · · −APL
P)Yt = Bet (4)
whereA and B include the information that the economic theory implies and are k× kmatrices.
L denotes lag operator,A1 · · ·AP are k× kmatrices, et is k× 1 orthogonalized disturbance term,
that is, et ∼ N(0, IK), and ∀s 6= t, E(ete
′
s) = 0K. Butwhat we can directly estimate is its reduced
form:
Yt = A1Yt−1 +A2Yt−2 + · · · · · ·+APYt−P + ut (5)
Where ut is disturbance term and ut ∼ N(0,Σ). Thus the relationship of the parameters in
equation (4) and equation (5) can be written as:
ut = A
−1Bet Σ = A
−1B(A−1B)′ (6)
By comparing the number of parameters between (4) and (5), we know that 3k
2−k
2 constraints
are needed to identify (4), where k is the number of endogenous variables. In order to iden-
tify the model, we order the variables in the SVAR model as: oil price, real output, price level,
interest rate, money supply and exchange rate. That is, the oil price is prior to other macro-
economy variables, signifying the oil price has a contemporary effects on other variables, but
not the other way around; a reasonable assumption, since the oil price is primarily determined
by the environment of the whole world but not a single country. Besides, we put all nomi-
nal variables after the real output. This is equivalent to what we assume, that the real output
has contemporary effects on them, but not the opposite; also, a weak assumption, since the
commonly known time-lag influences of nominal and policy variables on real variables, which
are indicated by the economic theory. Furthermore, we suppose the off-diagonal elements of
the B matrix are all zero, meaning that the error terms of different times are not correlated.
Considering that we have included current variables in the system, this assumption is also
not unreasonable. For now, combined with the normalization of the current variables’ coeffi-
cients to 1, we will exactly identify the SVAR system. The identification information is briefly
summarized as:
A =


1 0 0 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 1 0 0 0
a41 a42 a43 1 0 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 1 0
a61 a62 a63 a64 a65 1


B =


b11 0 0 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0 0 0
0 0 b33 0 0 0
0 0 0 b44 0 0
0 0 0 0 b55 0
0 0 0 0 0 b66


3.3 Nonlinear Test and Alternative Specification
Both VAR and SVAR models are based on linear specifications. Therefore, they can’t reflect
asymmetric macroeconomic variables, Mork (1989), Lee et al. (1995), Ferderer (1996), Davis
& Haltiwanger (2001), Balke et al. (2002), Hamilton (1996, 2003), Kilian & Vigfusson (2009),
Carlton (2010), Ravazzolo & Rothman (2010) and Herrera et al. (2010). Before estimating the
model, it is useful and necessary to carry out a nonlinearity test of the oil price’s effects. Define
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OPt as the log difference of oil price. Following Mork (1989), we separate the oil price into
positive and negative ones: OP+t = max(0,OPt) and OP
−
t = min(0,OPt). Along the lines of
Hamilton (2003), we run OLS as follows:
Vt = c+
p
∑
i=1
αiVt−i +
p
∑
i=1
βiOPt−i +
p
∑
i=1
γiOP
#
t−i + εt (7)
In which Vt ∈ {real output, price level, interest rate, money supply, exchange rate} and is
in log difference form, OP#t−i ∈ {OP
+
t ,OP
−
t }. Our null hypothesis is that the oil price has no
asymmetry effects, meaning γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γp = 0.
For robustness reasons, we also consider the transformation of oil price to allow for the
measure of howunsettling an increase in the price of oil is likely to be for the spending decisions
of consumers and firms, which is carefully studied by Hamilton (1996). Following literature,
we exploit the transformation due to Hamilton (1996), as is titled as “Net Oil Price Increase”
and is formally defined as:
NOPInt = max(0,OPt −max(OPt−1,OPt−2 · · ·OPt−n)) (8)
where NOPInt denotes “Net Oil Price Increase”, OPt stands for the current log-difference
oil price as before. Note that we have used log-difference of the variables in the SVAR analysis
above, thus this transformation is used for log-difference oil price. The parameter n need to be
chosen, following Park&Ratti (2008) and Wang et al. (2013), we choose n = 6.
3.4 Oil Price and Recent Data
According to Figure 1, along the substantial surge of world oil price, while the oil imports of
the other major countries (especially the largest oil import country US) in the world steadily
decline or remain stable, China’s oil imports, in contrast, have kept rapidly rising since the year
2004. Although this can be interpreted by many factors, our findings above will potentially
shed light on this. To see this, we now consider a simple framework. The relationship between
total output Y, and the three production inputs, the stock of capital K, labour L and energy E
at the aggregate level of the economy is interpreted as the following technology:
Yi = F(Ni,Ki, Ei) (9)
In which the subscript i ∈{c=China, o=other major countries}, China and other major coun-
tries are denoted by “c” and “o” for short, respectively (same as below). Suppose the price
of output is P, labour is paid W, capital is rented at price r and energy is bought at price Q.
The representative firm’s problem is to choose the number of workers, the amount of physical
capital and energy to be used in production to maximise the profits:
pii = PiF(Ni,Ki, Ei)− riKi −WiNi − QiEi (10)
The standard optimality condition for energy use is:
PiFE(Ni,Ki, Ei)−Qi = 0 (11)
Where FE(Ni,Ki, Ei) denotes the partial derivative of F(·) with respect to energy use E. After
some simple transformations, the elasticity of output Y to energy use E is derived from (11):
ηi =
∂lnFi
∂lnEi
=
EiQi
YiPi
(12)
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Note that the world oil price is the same for all the countries, i.e. Qc = Q0. The relative
elasticity of output to energy use between China and other major countries (denoted by νoc ) is
therefore:
νco = (
Ec
Yc
Yo
Eo
)
Po
Pc
(13)
When we denote the expression EcYc
Yo
Eo
by G, the relative elasticity of output to energy use
between China and other major countries can be rewritten as:
νco = G
Po
Pc
(14)
It is broadly known that the elasticity of output to energy is the percents of output increase
with respect to one percent rise of energy use. Hence, (14) can be seen as the relative elasticity
of output to energy between China and other major countries. Therefore, if oil price shocks
influence PoPc and G stays stable, we will claim that oil price will influence the relative elasticity
of output to energy and further influence the oil imports of China and other major countries.
This argument will be explored in detail in section 4.
4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Data
In the SVAR estimation, we convey monthly data spanning from 1994 to 2012 to uncover the
effects of oil price shocks on China’s macro-economy. While we can easily explore the influ-
ences of oil price shocks on othermacro-economic variables of relevance, we primarily focus on
real output, general price level, money supply, interest rate and exchange rate on two grounds.
First, they are most relevant to living standards and thus have received the closest attention
from ordinary people. Second, in oil literature (Bernanke et al. (1997), Zhang and Xu (2010),
Du et al.(2010) and so on) they are also the most commonly studied, therefore, primarily focus-
ing on these variables allows our results to be more comparable to the existing literature. In
addition, what is worthy of attention is although we can, to some extent, control the effect of
exchange rate by directly transforming the US dollar oil price to the RMB price (for example,
Cong et al.(2008), Du et al.(2010)), we explicitly incorporate the exchange rate into the variable
system. This is quite natural and reasonable, especially recognising the above-mentioned es-
sential role of international trade in China.
For the reason that the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) only publishes yearly
and quarterly GDP data, following Zhang and Xu (2010), we use monthly industry output
as the proxy of monthly output, and deflating them into real output. Consumer price index
(CPI) is generally regarded as an appropriate proxy of the price level. We use CPI, compared
to the same month in the previous year, available in NBS as the proxy of price level. It is
widely known that the central bank frequently reacts to the fluctuations of the macro-economy.
Therefore, variables that could best capture the central bank’s policy should be incorporated.
Money supply is regularly regarded as the monetary policy instrument of the People’s Bank of
China. Taking the broadly recognised distinctions between M1 and M2 into account, instead
of M2, we exploit M1 (obtained from the web-site of the People’s Bank of China) to stand for
monetary supply. In the view of the fact that the formation mechanism of interest rates is
becoming increasingly market-oriented, we also involve interest rates into our system, which
may, potentially, further capture the monetary policy. It is measured by the 6-month short-term
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loan interest rate derived from the arithmetic mean of the daily data, and, again, obtained from
the web-site of the People’s Bank of China. As for exchange rates and oil prices, we get them
from the OECD and EIA databases, respectively.
Table 1: Definitions and Statistics of Variables
Variables Definition Mean Stand Error Minimum Maximum
OilP($/Barrel) Oil Price 43.86 30.94 9.82 132.70
ER(RMB/$) Exchange Rate 7.90 0.66 6.30 8.71
M1(Hundred Million RMB) Money Supply 95045 74936 15435 289847
IR(%) Interest Rate 7.06 2.17 5.31 12.06
Y(Hundred Million RMB) Output 20694 19993 2992 77574
CPI(%) Price Level 4.31 6.34 -2.20 27.70
Note: We have normalised consumer price index(CPI) by subtracting 100.
As for the data used in the regressionmodel (equation(1)), different countries’ GDP growth
rates, short-term interest rates, money supply growth rates and exchange rates against the US
dollar over the period 1992:q1-2014:q2 are from the OECD database. As the GDP growth rate
of China from 1992:q1 to 2010:q4 is missing in the OECD database, we calculate the missing
values on the basis of the published NBS data. World oil price data is from EIA. It should be
noted that although, for China’s data, we can use those from domestic databases, instead, we
use the data from the OECD database, which enables our comparisons belowmore convincing,
since due to different calculation methods or reference points, even the same variable from dif-
ferent databases will be diverse.
4.2 Asymmetric Effects of Oil Price on The Price Level of China and Other Major
Countries
The regression results of (1) are presented in Table 2. These results provide substantial support
to the point that the effects of oil price on China’s price level and those of its major trade part-
ners’ are asymmetric–the oil price rise is intended to increase the price level of China’s major
trade partners more than that of China’s, thus China’s relative price drops. These asymme-
try effects are presumably correlated to the fact that oil pricing is not completely liberalized in
China. More concretely, the oil price in China is to some extent regulated by the government,
and thus oil price shocks will be inclined to have less influence on China’s price level. Table 2
suggests that our results survive different methods and the choices of different countries, and
therefore are quite robust.
In addition, considering that central banks frequently react to price level increases, we also
report IV estimators in Table 2. Specifically, for China, we use a two period-lag money supply
as the instrument of money supply itself; For its major trade partners, we use a two period-lag
interest rate as the instrument of interest rate itself. Since the time interval of one period is
one quarter, supposing that a two period-lag of money policy variable is not correlated with a
price level is a good approximation. Using one period-lag of money policy variable as instru-
ments does not essentially change the results. The previous IV estimationmeans that we regard
money supply as the endogenous variable in the regression for China, and the interest rate as
the endogenous variable in the regression for its major trade partners. We also consider the in-
terest rate is endogenous in the regression for China, the difference of the results are negligible.
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Besides, for the reason that the world oil price is the same for all the individual countries, fixed
effect regression is not implementable, we do not report fixed effect estimators.
Table 2: Oil Price Effects on Price Level
OLS IV
China Chosen Countries China Chosen Countries
RE BE RE BE
All OECD Countries and BRICS 0.0581 0.2703 0.2145 0.0578 0.2697 0.2121
Top 20
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.2473 0.2201 – 0.2471 0.2172
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.2329 0.1792 – 0.2339 0.1772
Top 40
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.2694 0.1952 – 0.2761 0.1948
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.2700 0.1864 – 0.2600 0.1766
Top 60
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.2694 0.1952 – 0.2761 0.1948
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.2623 0.2264 – 0.2602 0.2129
Note: The item “Net import from China and net oil import” under “Top 20” contains the countries whose net
import from China and net oil import from other countries simultaneously rank in the top 20 in the world and
also belong to the OECD or BRICS, and it corresponds to “Countries-A” in Table 7 in APPENDIX. The item
“Total trade with China and oil import” under “Top 20” contains the countries whose total trade with China
and oil import from other countries simultaneously rank in the top 20 in the world and also belongs to the
OECD or BRICS, it conresponds to “Countries-B” in Table 7 in APPENDIX. The explanations of the remainders
are similar. Note that the coefficients of two rows are the same, this is because, relative to the former criterion,
only one more country (Finland) is included according to the latter criterion. RE and BE stands for random effect
and between estimator, respectively.
- denotes 0.0581
– denotes 0.0578
All the coefficients are significant at 5 % level.
It should be noted that although we control the important variables, it may be the case that
the lag of oil price affect the price level. We therefore report the results (see Table 3) that control
the lag of oil price. Basically, our results do not change. Considering the limited space, only
the case that one-lag of oil price is controlled is reported. The results are similar in other cases.
While the coefficients of the current oil price substantially change, the sum of the coefficients
of the current oil price and one-period lag oil price is quite close to the coefficients in which
lag oil price is not controlled in Tabel 2. On the one hand, as it is indicated in section 3 the
oil price volatility may affect the price level; on the other hand, it is obviously correlated with
the oil price itself. That is oil price volatility is potentially endogenous, therefore it needs to be
included in the regression model. The estimated results controlling oil price volatility are re-
ported in Table 4. The coefficients are essentially similar to the ones in Table 2, again suggesting
the robustness of our results.
4.3 SVAR Results and A New Interpretation
Using the methodology described in section 3, we are able to investigate the effects of oil price
shocks on China’s macro-economy. The SVAR model is estimated using 2 lags, as determined
by AIC and FPE criterions.
The asymmetry test results based on (7) are reported in Table 5. While we can report the
12
Table 3: Oil Price Effects on Price Level (Lag Oil Prices Are Controlled)
OLS IV
China Chosen Countries China Chosen Countries
RE BE RE BE
All OECD Countries and BRICS 0.0454 0.1293 0.1414 0.0453 0.1311 0.1411
(0.0159) (0.1471) (0.0797) (0.0160) (0.1446) (0.0795)
Top 20
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.1660 0.1393 – 0.1657 0.1373
- (0.0847) (0.0876) – (0.0846) (0.0877)
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.1610 0.1109 – 0.1589 0.1100
- (0.0747) (0.0729) – (0.0776) (0.0727)
Top 40
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.1532 0.1223 – 0.1513 0.1161
- (0.1207) (0.0812) – 0.1231 (0.0883)
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.1431 0.1095 – 0.1479 0.1012
- (0.1232) (0.0834) – (0.1168) (0.0867)
Top 60
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.1532 0.1223 – 0.1513 0.1161
- (0.1207) (0.0812) – 0.1231 (0.0883)
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.1246 0.1435 – 0.1266 0.1307
- (0.1440) (0.0901) – (0.1393) (0.0977)
Note: The explanations of this table is similar to those of Table 2. The numbers denote the coefficients of the current
and lag oil price. And the ones in brackets stand for the coefficients of one-period-lag oil price.
- denotes 0.0454 (0.0159)
– denotes 0.0453 (0.0160)
All the coefficients are significant at 5 % level.
lags chosen by certain criterion, we instead present all lags of interest. This is motivated by the
combined observations that the lag lengths chosen based on different criteria are not consistent
and the criterion values of different lags are quite close. It can be claimed from the results that
the null hypothesis couldn’t be rejected in most cases, which in turn signifies that the linear
symmetric model provides a good approximation inmodelling the responses to oil price shocks
(Kilian & Vigfusson (2011)), and increases the credibility of our model specification. Figure 5
presents the resulting impulse functions of real output, level price, interest rate, money supply
and exchange rate to oil price shocks.
The response of main macro-economy variables are presented in Figure (5). We also re-
estimate the SVARmodel under the specification of Hamilton (1996), and the resulting impulse
response functions are shown in Figure(6). Though the results is quantitatively different from
those illustrated in Figure 5, the response directions don’t essentially change. Even if the dif-
ferences between them in terms of quantity can well be explained by recognising that this
transformation moderates the fluctuation of the oil price.
Both Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that, except for the responses of output and exchange rate,
our findings are quite intuitive and consistent with most of the existing literature. Specifically,
the general price level of China rises in response to an increase in oil price. The rise in interest
rates and decrease (although there is a small rise in period 4, it is not statistically significant)
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Table 4: Oil Price Effects on Price Level (Volatility is Included)
OLS IV
China Chosen Countries China Chosen Countries
RE BE RE BE
All OECD Countries and BRICS 0.0594 0.2577 0.2115 0.0600 0.2565 0.2101
Top 20
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.2366 0.2120 – 0.2350 0.2079
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.2210 0.1786 – 0.2203 0.1793
Top 40
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.2646 0.1905 – 0.2635 0.1891
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.2412 0.1935 – 0.2395 0.1906
Top 60
Net import from China and net oil import - 0.2646 0.1905 – 0.2635 0.1891
Total trade with China and oil import - 0.2413 0.2164 – 0.2395 0.2010
Note: The explanations of this table is similar to those of Table 2.
- denotes 0.0594
– denotes 0.0600
All the coefficients are significant at 5 % level.
Table 5: Asymmetry Test
1-Lag 2-Lags 3-Lags 4-Lags 5-Lags 6-Lags 7-Lags 8-Lags 9-Lags 10-Lags
Output 0.4885 0.6985 0.3452 0.8074 0.9220 0.9393 0.9561 0.7935 0.8072 0.8931
(0.48) (0.36) (1.11) (0.40) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.58) (0.59) (0.49)
Price Level 0.0418** 0.1287** 0.3643 0.3004 0.3065 0.6717 0.5333 0.8620 0.6534 0.8605
(4.22) (2.08) (1.07) (1.23) (1.22) (0.67) (0.87) (0.49) (0.76) (0.54)
Interest Rate 0.0129** 0.0235** 0.0744* 0.0916* 0.1367 0.2802 0.2933 0.4101 0.5261 0.5343
(6.29) (3.82) (2.34) (2.03) (1.70) (1.42) (1.22) (1.04) (0.90) (0.90)
Money Supply 0.7656 0.9229 0.8787 0.9759 0.9381 0.8076 0.7773 0.5028 0.4356 0.6990
(0.09) (0.08) (0.23) (0.12) (0.25) (0.50) (0.57) (0.92) (1.01) (0.73)
Exchange Rate 0.7188 0.5657 0.7055 0.4853 0.4794 0.6016 0.7008 0.7649 0.8221 0.8820
(0.13) (0.57) (0.47) (0.87) (0.90) (0.76) (0.67) (0.61) (0.57) (0.51)
Note: The numbers out and in parentheses are p-values and F statistics, respectively. Null hypothesis is that the world oil
price has no asymmetry effects on the variables of interest.
*** denotes significant at 1% level
** denotes significant at 5% level
* denotes significant at 10% level
in money supply indicate the monetary policy tends to be tight in response to oil price shocks,
showing the central bank’s worry about inflation induced by oil price rising. Interestingly and
notably, the response of interest rate is more persistent and quantitatively significant than that
of money supply. This may reflect the swing in China’s monetary policy instrument from giv-
ing priority to money quantity towards money price. Actually, in as early as 2001, Xia & Liao
(2001) pointed out that money quantity is not appropriate to function as an intermediate target
of monetary policy any more.
One puzzle that emerges is that the real output of China is positively correlated with oil
price shocks. This finding is similar to that of Du et al. (2010) whose study period spans from
1995 to 2008. In their paper, by arguing that “· · · both China’s growth and the world’s oil price
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Figure 5: The Responses of MainMacro-economy Variables to Oil Price Shocks (95% confidence
interval)
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are affected by US and EU countries’ economic activity in the same direction, and this in turn
makes us observe · · · China’s GDP and world’s oil price is positively correlated from 1995 to
2008” , the authors give a possible and preliminary interpretation for this. But we want to go
further and examine this puzzle not only from exogenous factors, but also pay more attention
on China itself. As for the response of the exchange rate, according to Figure 5 and Figure
6, it can be claimed that oil price shocks slightly appreciate the RMB, which is also counter-
intuitive. A similar pattern is found by Huang & Guo (2007), which specialises in the study of
the effects of oil price shocks on China’s exchange rate, using a four variable VAR system. The
authors’ explanation is “· · · China’s less dependence on imported oil than its trade partners
included in the RMB basket peg regime and rigorous energy regulation.” Their study period
spans over 1990-2005, we know from Figure 1 that this argument maybe a plausible approxi-
mation for the real condition of that period. But after 2008, China has been the world’s second
largest oil-import country and its oil imports still keep rising, obviously their argument will
not convincing any more.
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Figure 6: The Responses ofMainMacro-economy Variables to Oil Price Shocks (Hamilton Spec-
ifications) (95% confidence interval)
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Is there any mechanism that can simultaneously interpret these two puzzles in a unified
framework? We find above that there is a higher increase in the price level of China’s main
trade partners resulting from oil price shocks than that of China’s. Based on this result, not
only can we interpret the abnormal phenomenon of the output’s response to oil shocks, but
also, in prospect, resolve the puzzle of the RMB’s slight appreciation. This is because, relative
to China, the higher increase of its main trade-partners price levels resulting from oil price
shocks will tend to stimulate China’s exports and thus its output; In addition, economic theory
documents that the decline of the relative price will be inclined to appreciate the exchange rate,
which implies that our results potentially provide a justification of the slight appreciation of
the RMB against the US dollar resulting from oil price shocks. Although the appreciation of
the RMB will moderate the positive effects of relative price decrease on the exports, we have
reason to believe that it will not change the effects, since both Figure 5 and Figure 6 suggest
that the appreciation resulting from oil price shocks is marginal.
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4.4 Our Findings and Recent Data
We investigate that the way oil price shocks influence the relative price of China to its major
trade partners in the world is also well consistent with recent data. One of the most salient
facts is that along the substantial surge of the world oil price , while the oil imports of the other
major countries (especially the largest oil import country US) in the world steadily decline or
remain stable, China’s oil imports, in contrast, have kept rapidly rising since the year 2004.
Note that from (14) PoPc is the relative price of other major countries to China. The evidence
we present above suggests that the magnitude of price level rise induced by oil price shocks
of China is less than that of other major countries in the world, which implies that PoPc rises.
And this, in turn, tends to increase the relative elasticity of output to energy use νco . Here, we
implicitly assume G in equation (14) stays stable or the change of G is independent of PoPc . There
are two possibilities that G stays stable, one is both EcYc and
Yo
Eo
are stable, the other is that they
change in the same direction. To see this assumption is not an unreasonable approximation, we
calculate the ratios of energy E to output Y of China and other countries (all OECD countries
and BRICS as a whole). Both output Y and energy use E here are in real terms. The results are
shown in Table 6. It can be easily argued that the values of G basically stay stable. While there
seems to be a structural change in about 2008, to a great extent, it can be largely contributed by
the financial crisis in 2008 (thus is exogenous) rather than the change of PoPc .
Table 6: Ratios of Energy Use to Output
Year EcYc
Eo
Yo
G
2004 1.2078 0.8990 1.3435
2005 1.1515 0.8792 1.3098
2006 1.1422 0.8491 1.3452
2007 1.1243 0.8263 1.3607
2008 1.1241 0.8176 1.3748
2009 1.1743 0.7993 1.4691
2010 1.2382 0.7818 1.5837
2011 1.1537 0.7536 1.5309
2012 1.0915 0.7453 1.4645
Note: The real outputs Yc and Yo data is obtained fromWorld
Bank database. Their units are billion (2005 constant) US dol-
lars. Ec and Eo are from EIA database as above, the units are
Thousand Barrels/day.
As we have mentioned in part 4 of section 3, νco can be considered to be the relative elastic-
ity of output to energy of China to other major countries. Straightforwardly, the rise of relative
elasticity of output to energy of China to othermajor countries contributed by oil price increase,
could partially explain the increase of China’s oil imports and the drop of other major coun-
tries’ oil imports in recent years. This is because the rise of the elasticity in output with respect
to a given energy use, which implies that energy is more useful to China, will stimulate it to
import more energy, and also induce the firms to substitute other input factors by energy. In
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order to see more clearly how our findings fit the fact that together with the dramatic surge
of world oil price , while the oil imports of the other major countries (especially the largest
oil import country US) in the world steadily decline or remain stable, China’s oil imports, in
contrast, have kept steadily rising since the year 2004, we have briefly summarized our points
above in a flowchart as follows:
Figure 7: A Interpretation For Observed Facts
The World Oil Price Increases
The Relative Price of China ( PcPo ) Drops
The Relative Output-Energy Elasticity of China (νco) Rises
The Oil Imports of China Increases The Oil Imports of Other Countries Drops
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
International trade has played a significant role in China over the last 20 years. In this paper
we examined the influences of oil price shocks on China from this new perspective. We find
that world oil price shocks have a positive relationship with both China’s real output and price
level. We argue that the asymmetry effects (may be resulted from the fact that the oil pricing
is to some extent regulated by the government in China) of oil price shocks on China and its
major trade partners maybe an important factor in accounting for the “abnormal” response of
output to oil price shocks. Besides, this argument also provides a new, possibly more reason-
able, interpretation for the slight appreciation of the RMB responding to oil price increase, also
found by other authors. Moreover, our results also shed light on the fact that together with the
dramatic surge of world oil price, while the oil imports of the other major countries (especially
the largest oil import country US) in the world steadily decline or remain stable, China’s oil
imports, in contrast, have kept rising fast since the year 2004. What needs to be pointed out
is that China’s exchange rate slightly appreciates in response to oil price rises. Future work is
needed to identify to what extent this slight appreciation of exchange rate depresses the posi-
tive effects of relative price decrease on the exports of China and thus on output.
Our paper also has significant policy implications. We have found that both the real out-
put and price levels of China are positively correlated with oil price shocks. Imagine that,
confronted with an oil price increase, the authority mistakenly considers the output is, just as
many papers imply, negatively correlated with oil price shocks, and take steps to stimulate the
economy. This may lead to a second round increase in both the real output and the price level,
the economy will consequently be liable to get overheated. Now consider another case that the
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authority wants to offset the inflation induced by oil price increases. If it believe that the output
negatively responds to oil price increases, worrying about further recession in output caused
by tight policy, the authority will be inclined to compromise its original target and take modest
measures to offset the inflation induced by the oil price increase. Our results, however, imply
that a relatively severe measure may be a better choice in this case.
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APPENDIX
Table 7: Classification of Countries
Countries-A Countries-B Countries-C Countries-D Countries-E Countries-F
US US US US Finland US US Ireland
Turkey UK Turkey UK Chile Turkey UK Indonesia
Poland Netherlands Spain Turkey Canada Spain Turkey India
Netherlands Korea Portugal Sweden Brazil Portugal Switzerland Hungary
Italy Japan Poland Spain Belgium Poland Sweden Greece
India Italy Netherlands South Africa Australia Netherlands Spain Germany
France India Italy Poland - Italy South Africa France
Belgium Germany Israel Netherlands - Israel Russia Finland
- France India Korea - India Poland Denmark
- Canada Hungary Japan - Hungary New Zealand Chile
- Brazil Greece Italy - Greece Netherlands Canada
- Australia France Indonesia - France Korea Brazil
- - Belgium India - Finland Japan Belgium
- - - Germany - Belgium Italy Austria
- - - France - - Israel Australia
Note: This table is a supplement of Table 2. And “-” in this table is intended to fill the space. With regard to the meanings of
Countries-A· · ·Countries-F, see the note of Table 2.
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